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Within both professional theatre and the academy today, the prevailing 
discourse about theatrical representation is concerned with just two types of 
representation, what political philosopher Hanna Fenichel Pitkin calls 
"descriptive" and "symbolic" representation. I argue, however, that theatre also 
provides a third kind of representation, which it shares with government: that of 
acting in lieu of or on behalf of, another person. 
The word "representation" comes from repraesentare, Latin for "to make 
present or manifest or to present again," Pitkin points out, and "representation, 
taken generally, means the making present in some sense of something which is 
nevertheless not present literally or in fact."1 In political discourse, according to 
Ward E. Y. Elliott's article on representation in U.S. constitutional law, the word 
has come to mean "standing or acting in the place of another, normally because 
a group is too large, dispersed, or uninformed for its members to act on their 
own."2 Clearly, many different styles of governance meet this broad definition, not 
just the democratic models we tend to associate with the term, and Pitkin's 
landmark study The Concept of Representation establishes philosophical 
categories that precisely chart the various types of political representation. 
Pitkin's "descriptiverepresentation" refers to the faithful correspondence 
between the composition of a representative body and those it represents: a 
representative legislature is not given this name because it has been authorized to 
act for the nation, but because it "stands for" its constituents by resembling them.3 
Proponents of proportional representation such as John Stuart Mill hold this view 
that representation requires a descriptive likeness; for them, every group must be 
reproduced in the legislature in proportion to its size in the state.4 Like descriptive 
representation, Pitkin's "symbolic representation," too, describes one entity 
representing another by "standing for" it, the way a head of state, while not 
sharing a descriptive likeness with a vast nation, can serve as a living expression 
of that nation's unity. As Pitkin describes, a symbol, such as a political leader, 
expresses a referent, such as a nation, not because of any objective link between 
the two, but simply because we believe it does, and thus symbolic representation 
often involves "manipulating affective responses and forming habits."5 
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Descriptive and symbolic representation both occur in the theatre in a 
number of ways. In the case of the former, the dramatic characters can resemble 
real individuals or classes of people in the outside world, contemporary or 
historical, like "Soldiers" in Hamlet, and they can mirror actual persons in the 
audience, like Teddy, a professor of philosophy, in Harold Pinter's Homecoming, 
performed at Harvard University's American Repertory Theatre. Alternatively, 
in another form of descriptive representation, the actors themselves, rather than 
the roles they play, can share a similarity with members of the audience, as with 
royal attendants taking parts in Renaissance court masques and with student 
productions throughout the ages. And when the citizens of Athens, gathered in 
458 BC at the city's annual dramatic festival in honor of Dionysus, watched the 
original performance of Aeschylus's Oresteia trilogy, the theatrical production as 
a whole served as a symbolic representation of the (ideological construct of) the 
unity of the polis. 
Analyses of "representation" in theories of the theatre conventionally 
treat both descriptive and symbolic representation. We are all familiar with 
studies of the "representation" of women in drama, which treat the descriptive 
portrayal of women, or analyses of the "representation" of imperialism on the 
stage, which treat the symbolization of imperialism. When Herbert Blau, 
addressing ideological issues of theatre, writes of "those who, within the system 
of representation, have not been represented as they see themselves" (emphasis 
added),6 he refers to a lack of descriptive likeness between how people perceive 
themselves and how they are portrayed on stage. When Lawrence Levine asserts 
that the passionate, charismatic, acting style and populist views of the nineteenth-
century American tragedian Edwin Forrest stimulated working-class Americans 
to feel that he was a "symbol" for them,7 he refers to a matter of symbolic 
representation. 
Beyond both descriptive and symbolic representation, however, exists 
another important form of representation manifest in the political realm and the 
theatre alike, which most dramatic critics have failed to address explicitly. 
Adopting Pitkin's conceptual categories, I call this form of representation by her 
term "acting for"* Audience members authorize the actors in their dramatic roles 
to experience the events of the play on their behalf the way members of a polis 
delegate the conduct of affairs of state to their representatives in the government. 
The conferring of the responsibility to take action entailed in vicarious, projective 
experience constitutes the heart of the theatrical enterprise, just as the conferring 
of the authority to govern constitutes the basis of the state, according to traditional 
Western political philosophy.9 
Political thinkers, from Plato to Hobbes and Rousseau to Hannah Arendt, 
perceive structural similarities between representation in the theatre and 
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representation in government. Rousseau, for example, equally opposes the 
playgoer's practice of watching actors perform noble deeds on stage and the 
citizen's practice of sending legislators to vote at a national assembly: in both 
cases, he deplores the abdication of the delegator and the abnegation of the 
representor that he sees as inherent in the act of representation itself.10 And this 
kinship between government and stage, so evident to political philosophers, is also 
visible from the opposite vantage point, from the perspective of those working 
within theatre and observing the political world. Numerous playwrights in the 
western tradition, from Aeschylus and Aristophanes to Genet and Millier, 
elaborate the resemblances between acting for in theatre and acting for in 
government. 
In Jean Genet's The Blacks, for instance, Archibald, the chief spokesman 
for the group of blacks testifying about a murder to "the Court," announces to the 
spectators: 
This evening we shall perform for you. But, in order that you 
may remain comfortably settled in your seats in the presence of 
the drama that is already unfolding here, in order that you be 
assured that there is no danger of such a drama's worming its 
way into your precious lives, we shall even have the decency—a 
decency learned from you—to make communication impossible. 
We shall increase the distance that separates us—a distance that 
is basic—by our pomp, our manners, our insolence—for we are 
also actors.11 
The audience, or delegators, will stay safely seated, delegating the enactment of 
what the words "danger" and "worming" suggest is an unpleasant story, to the 
actors, or representatives, who take the stage and unfold the drama in their stead. 
In the same way, members of the polis may remain safely in the private sector 
while their political representatives manage public affairs in lieu of them. 
The processes of theatre, however, do not always operate as we expect 
them to. In the theatre as in the state, individuals are driven by a host of 
competing motives, by short-term as well as long-term interests, by irrational 
urges as well as rational calculations. Rulers abuse their power or fail to provide 
what their citizens have a right to expect; citizens exhibit lawless behavior or are 
unwilling or unable to delegate authority to their rulers. Here I wish to attend to 
instances in government and on stage when acting for cannot or does not occur, 
examples of flawed and invalid representation and outright despotism on the part 
of the theatrical performance, as well as failures of delegation on the part of the 
theatre audience.12 
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I begin with a problem of theatrical acting for that has previously been 
approached only as a problem of "standing for" (to use Pitken's term for both 
descriptive and symbolic representation). Solving this problem, I contend, 
requires understanding the function of the stage as action on our behalf or in our 
stead (acting for), rather than simply as depiction or symbolization (standing for). 
In his study Great Reckonings in Little Rooms, Bert O. States considers a set of 
stage entities that pose problems of descriptive representation in theatre. He 
begins with Walter Benjamin's example in "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction" of the working clock: "A clock that is working will 
always be a disturbance on the stage."13 By "disturbance," Benjamin means a 
challenge to the illusion of the stage, to the audience's ignoring, or even forgetting 
for periods of time, that they are watching a play rather than real life. Disagreeing 
with Benjamin that the disruption is caused by real time's contradiction of stage 
time, States proposes that it is due to a clock's being an entity "that is visibly 
obeying its own laws of behavior,"14 and he groups fire, running water, children, 
and dogs in the same category of phenomena. Children, for example, create 
disquiet because "they are conspicuously not identical with their characters," 
States professes;15 children are obviously themselves and not mere descriptive 
likenesses of their roles. For all the items in his set of representational 
disturbances, States posits the following explanation: 
We arrive, inevitably, at something like a law of 
complementarity: to the extent that something on stage arouses 
awareness of its external (or workaday) significations, its 
internal (or illusionary) signification is reduced.16 
States holds that if a stage entity trumpets its real-world identity too loudly, the 
audience cannot concentrate upon its dramatic identity, upon what it is intended 
to stand for. 
Although States considers children part of his group of problematic 
signifiers, "infants and toddlers" would be a more consistently accurate term here 
than "children," for many skilled young actors can project a dramatic identity 
effectively. We may wonder at an evening performance if the child actors are out 
past their bedtimes, but no more than we might wonder at a Sunday matinée if the 
adult actors will find it tedious to perform again that night. With an infant or 
toddler, on the other hand, we are indeed preoccupied with its "external 
significations," its state of infancy: we wait for it to cry, wet its clothes, and the 
like. That aside, States's "law of complementarity" is quite right as far as it goes: 
it explains well the limits on the capacity for standing for of properties and 
persons on stage such as a fountain of running water or a baby. States, however, 
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makes some additional observations about the sentient beings in his group, 
children and dogs, that indicate the presence of a "disturbance" that the attributes 
of descriptive representation alone cannot fully explain. The stage items States 
isolates pose problems not only for signification, but also for the interactions of 
acting for. 
States notes that we wonder of the child actors playing in Medea, "Do 
they understand the play?," and that with the stage animal "[t]here is always the 
fact that it doesn't know it is in a play . . ."17 Both comments relate to the 
intellectual awareness of the actor, a primary factor in the process of acting for 
other people, whether for spectators or for political constituents. Hobbes affirms 
an infant's or mentally-impaired adult's lack of capacity to act for others, stating 
that "it is an inconvenience in monarchy, that the sovereignty may descend upon 
an infant, or one that cannot discern between good and evil"; in such cases, 
Hobbes observes, a protectorate must be established.18 A. Phillips Griffiths, too, 
notes in his essay "How Can One Person Represent Another?" that "we should not 
allow lunatics to be represented by lunatics. . . . because this is not a good way, 
indeed is not any way of ensuring that the interests of lunatics are represented"19; 
lunatics do not have the ability to act in the interest of other persons, even other 
lunatics. Of course the activities delegated to an actor are quite different from 
those delegated to a monarch, and an infant actor may fulfill the responsibilities 
of his or her position to an extent an infant monarch could never acheive. 
Nevertheless, the lack of rational consciousness that prevents a baby or an insane 
person from functioning as a legal or political representative also problematizes 
their functioning as a theatrical representative, as Peter Weiss suggests in his 
drama Marat/Sade. 
Weiss's play, officially titled The Persecution and Assassination of Jean-
Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton under the 
Direction of the Marquis de Sade, depicts a theatrical performance in a mental 
home staged by the patients for an audience of aristocrats. During the 
performance of the play-within-the-play, a number of the inmate-actors fail as 
representatives because they persist in acting on behalf of'themselves rather than 
for others. The inmate playing the part of Duperret, for example, is an 
"erotomaniac,"20 and refuses to stop the genuine molestation of the actress who 
plays his lover. At one point, the stage directions tell us, "Duperret approaches 
Corday, pawing her furtively. The Herald raps him on the hand with his staff' 
(20). Against all direction to the contrary, the erotomaniac insists upon furthering 
his private sexual interests rather than taking the public, dramatic actions his part 
calls for. Disrupting the story line of the play-within-the-play, Duperret fails to 
act in the interests oftht director de Sade's audience—that is, the audience's 
interest in having performed for them the play they came to see. 
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Of course, others of the patients, who do not appear to be insane at all, 
quite consciously insist upon forsaking their dramatic roles in order to voice their 
own interests, such as those who chant "Who keeps us prisoner/ Who locks us in/ 
We're normal and we want our freedom" (27). As Una Chaudhuri remarks, "they 
begin to challenge the ideological structure within which their alleged lunacy is 
established."21 Here Weiss depicts a conscious refusal, rather than an incapacity, 
to act for those who serve as jailors. 
Concurrent with these failures of theatrical acting for is a failure of 
political representation, Marat/Sade shows us. Marat's assassination in the play-
within-the-play occurs in 1793, "Four years after the Revolution/ and the old 
king's execution" (22); the performance of that play by the inmates of the asylum 
of Charenton takes place in 1808 when Napoleon Bonaparte is emperor. In the 
1793 inner time frame, the sovereign has been deposed in an initial breakdown of 
political representation, and the revolutionary leaders who are now governing 
France do not appear to be acting in the interests of the people any more than the 
king did. As the characters of the "Four Singers" report in song, "We've got new 
generals our leaders are new/ They sit and argue and all that they do/ is sell their 
own colleagues and ride on their backs/ and jail them and break them or give them 
all the axe" (25). The leaders willfully refuse to provide proper representation for 
the people of France. In the 1808 outer time frame, the new sovereign delivers the 
same old war and poverty: 
. . . he has promised us peace eternal 
and gives us work in the arsenal 
and in honour of the revolution 
he calls himself emperor Napoleon 
It is we can tell you a feast for the eye 
and with rumbling bellies we watch it go by . . . (144) 
Napoleon's use of spectacle, "a feast for the eye," fails to satisfy the physical 
hunger of his people. As Griffiths proposes, "it is only correct to call [acting on 
the principal's behalf] representation, and not gift, abdication, etc., if it is 
presupposed that to act properly the representative must consider the principal's 
interests"22; in the terms of the play-within-the-play, the constituents' interests are 
the social welfare of the common people of France, and both Robespierre and his 
cohorts and Napoleon Bonaparte do a poor job of considering those interests. 
In Marat/Sade, Weiss makes a choice to portray this inadequate political 
representation through the medium of a play staged in a mental asylum. For his 
critique of Napoleon's rule, the dramatist could have chosen to depict a burgher 
at home with his family or villagers trading in a marketplace; rather than a 
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familial or a commercial metaphor for government, however, he selects a 
theatrical metaphor, and, furthermore, he selects mentally imbalanced 
protagonists. This choice exposes both the structural affinity between theatre and 
politics and the flawed nature of the theatrical representation provided by those 
who lack the requisite level of perspicacity. 
States is right that the workaday signification of certain actors, say infants 
and dogs, overwhelms their illusionary signification by impairing their capacity 
for descriptive representation. Something else States notes about infants and dogs, 
however,—their lack of consciousness that they are acting in a play—also disrupts 
their ability to act for; as we see in Marat/Sade, those who lack this consciousness 
act for themselves and cannot consistently act for an audience. Actors regularly 
performed drunk during the 1974 season of the Theater am Turm (TAT) in 
Frankfurt, and they were wont to abandon the stage entirely in favor of fighting 
each other in the aisles.23 The TAT actors' awareness that they were in a play was 
no doubt impaired by their inebriation, and they failed to act for their spectators. 
Similarly, during Peter Brook's production of Marat/Sade itself, in London in 
1964, the inmates' riot at the end of the play was performed so rigorously that 
sometimes actors were knocked unconscious24; after that, the actors could not be 
said to be acting at all. We can still delegate the authority to act in our stead to 
the dramatic characters whom the mentally-incapacitated adult and the infant and 
the dog portray, but the simultaneous delegation to the actors themselves is not 
possible here. Actors who lack rational consciousness cannot properly fulfill the 
conditions of theatrical acting for. 
The prime concern of this study is, of course, certain instances of human 
interaction, whether in the theatre or the state. Our inquiry into delegation and 
representation by persons may, nevertheless, help to illuminate the problematic 
representation of States's insentient stage entities. The props States analyzes—a 
working clock, fire, and running water—are all moving by themselves. Of course 
no object can know that it is in a play, but these moving objects advertise their 
ignorance by innocently carrying on with their customary, private activity. We do 
not feel that these props, so obviously acting by and for themselves, are 
undertaking public action, acting for us, and thus our political relationship with 
the stage is disturbed. I can imagine objects of great workaday signification that 
can move, but cannot move independently, such as a bicycle, and thus do not 
similarly advertise their lack of dramatic awareness. The bicycle may emphasize 
its external signification, for example, its condition of being a brand new twenty-
four-speed Specialized Stumpjumper, to the detriment of its illusionary 
signification as a battered three-speed Raleigh, but leaning against a wall or ridden 
across the stage by an actor, the bicycle is an integral part of the performance: it 
acts only for us, the spectators, rather than by, and thus apparently for, itself. 
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States, then, has arrived at a set of stage entities that create particular uneasiness 
in the theatre because they threaten two kinds of theatrical representation, both 
standing for and acting for, although his own explicit formulation extends only to 
the problem with the former. 
Just as individuals who lack rational consciousness cannot fulfill the 
conditions of theatrical acting for as representatives, neither can they be full-
fledged delegators. Hobbes asserts that "children, fools, and madmen that have 
no use of reason, may be personated by guardians, or curators; but can be no 
authors, during that time, of any action done by them.. ."25 As Hobbes sees it, a 
guardian may be appointed by a third person ("he that hath right of governing 
them") to act on behalf of someone without sufficient acuity to act in the legal 
world, such as a child, but the actions of the guardian cannot be ascribed to the 
child, because the child lacks the consciousness necessary to undertake the act of 
legal delegation. The child-guardian relationship clearly departs from Hobbes's 
model of political representation, according to which the people are 
. . . authors, of every thing their representative saith, or doth in 
their name; every man giving their common representative, 
authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions 
the représenter doth . . .26 
In the case of political representation, the actions of the representative are indeed 
attributed to the people represented; or, as Griffiths more precisely phrases it, the 
principals "may be regarded as being committed to the consequences of acts" 
performed by their representatives.27 Hobbes rightly observes that this cannot be 
true of "children, fools, and madmen"—although I will again add the caveat that 
we will substitute "infants and toddlers" for "children" so as to avoid the case of 
the particularly acute child. The polis does not consider infants or mentally 
incapacitated adults fully bound by legislation passed by their political 
representatives: ordinarily, for example, their legal transgressions may earn them 
institutionalization, but not criminal liability. Since infants and mentally 
incapacitated adults are not committed to the consequences of their 
representatives' actions, they cannot be full delegators in the process of political 
representation. Neither, we might add, can dogs, for the same reason, although 
dogs may have human guardians. 
Acknowledging the substantive differences between undertaking an act 
of legal delegation and going to see a play, we must allow that an audience 
composed of toddlers, or severely mentally-impaired adults, could have a 
satisfying experience at the theatre. On the other hand, we can envision such an 
audience, whose members enjoy the entertainment offered by the sights and sounds 
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of the performance, but who are not intellectually aware enough to delegate 
authority to the stage. Toddlers and unaware adults are unlikely to give up their 
own vocalization and physical movement in favor of the speech and action on the 
stage; they lack the consciousness to commission the actors and dramatic 
characters to act for them. In Marat/Sade, for instance, the inmates who are not 
themselves on stage are unable to participate as spectators. Instead, "Any not 
required in the play devote themselves to physical exercises. . . . They make 
habitual movements, turn in circles, hop, mutter to themselves, wail, scream and 
so on" (11). The mental patients lack the capacity to delegate action and speech 
to the performers; unaware that the performers could act on their behalf, they do 
not even follow the events on stage consistently. 
In Weiss's play, the lack of rational consciousness among the parties 
involved imposes limits on representation and delegation such that the acts of the 
representative cannot be ascribed to the so-called delegator. In other words, when 
Duperret paws Corday, his fellow patients in the audience cannot be said to have 
pawed her vicariously, both because Duperret is behaving privately rather than on 
behalf of his audience and because the other inmates who are not themselves 
actors do not have sufficient perspicuity to undertake a vicarious, projective 
experience. In a more extreme case, the acts of the representative cannot be 
attributed to the delegating party because the latter ceases to exist at all. An 
actor's soliloquy in the third scene of a play, for instance, cannot be attributed to 
the play's spectators if they all walked out of the theatre during the second scene. 
If we switch from the theatre to political history this outcome is clear. In 1989 
when there were no longer any residents of East Germany, for example, because 
the inhabitants of that region had all become residents of a united Germany, the 
government of the former East Germany lost its legitimacy. The men and women 
who formerly acted for the people of East Germany now acted only for themselves. 
The demise of the delegating party provokes a crisis in the dynamic of 
representation, as The Task by Heiner Miiller, anticipating the fall of his nation's 
government by a decade, makes clear. 
Examining Miiller's pronouncements about theatre in the dramatist's 
interviews and essays, Robert Weimann writes that "[wjhat Miiller has in mind is, 
literally, a strategic refusal to authorize meaning, to preclude representations in 
which material and idea, signifier and signified, are brought together meaningfully 
at all."28 Weimann may be right that it is Miiller's intent to disrupt the relation 
of "signifier and signified" in the theatre, and hence the operation of standing for. 
However, in The Task he goes a step further and disrupts the relationship between 
delegator and representative, in other words, the operation of acting for. Indeed, 
Miiller's play is one of the most thorough explorations of acting for in 
contemporary drama and merits an extended analysis. 
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The play opens with a depiction of political history. The audience 
quickly learns that after sending three emissaries to Jamaica to incite a slave revolt 
there, the Assembly of the post-revolutionary Republic of France has been 
terminated. The emissaries eventually discover this by letter: 
DEBUISSON hands Galloudec a piece of paper. Galloudec 
and Sasportas read. The government which gave us the task to 
organize a rebellion of the slaves here in Jamaica isn't in office 
anymore. The General Bonaparte has dissolved the Directorate 
with the bayonets of his grenadiers. France is called 
Napoleon.29 
In a two-step political transaction, the people of France delegated sovereignty to 
the Assembly, and the Assembly then delegated a specific political function, the 
incitement of a slave rebellion, to a representative body composed of Debuisson, 
Galloudec, and Sasportas. Now, however, the Assembly no longer possesses 
governing authority; hence, it cannot delegate powers to agents. In a third-step 
act of delegation, the emissaries commission yet another party, a sailor, to track 
down a member of the former Assembly for them, a man named Antoine. The 
sailor succeeds in locating Antoine: "I am the Antoine you've been looking 
for. . . . I was there when the people stormed the Bastille. I was there when the 
head of the last of the Bourbons dropped into the basket" (86), the ex-
Assemblyman confesses. Nevertheless, Antoine denies all knowledge of the 
Jamaican mission, maintaining, "I don't know of any task. I don't assign tasks, 
I don't have the power" (86). The erstwhile delegator, now powerless, repudiates 
his act of delegation. 
As Rousseau points out, a citizen's "private interest may speak to him 
quite differently from the common interest,"30 and the play emphasizes from the 
first that the three agents believe they are acting on behalf of the Assembly and not 
in their own interests. Debuisson is the heir apparent to his family's huge slave 
plantation in Jamaica, so he will suffer tremendous financial loss if the slaves win 
their freedom; Galloudec says he has "learned to hate the Revolution in the bloody 
rains of the Guillotine" and is "a loyal servant to his gracious lord Debuisson who 
believes in the holy order of monarchy and church" (89), positions unlikely to be 
compatible with a slave revolt; and Sasportas, a former slave, declares: "Fleeing 
the successful black revolution in Haiti, I attached myself to Master Debuisson 
since God has created me for slavery" (89), an ironic statement that nevertheless 
indicates that Sasportas is ambivalent about his mission in Jamaica. All three men 
put aside their personal interests or feelings in order to act for the body that they 
represent; all face a crisis when the delegating party ceases to exist. 
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Debuisson responds to the news by ripping up the letter and announcing, 
"I free us of our task" (96); his position is that the absence of the delegator erases 
the representative's responsibility. Boasting, "I laugh at the nigger who wants to 
wash himself white with Liberty. I laugh at the peasant who struts about in the 
mask of Equality I want my piece of the cake of the world" (99), he renounces 
the interests he has undertaken on behalf of the Assembly (freeing Jamaican 
blacks from slavery) and turns back to his own interests (his "piece of the cake" 
in the form of a wealthy plantation). Galloudec, however, takes the opposite 
stand: 
I have risked my neck for a year and more now, preached till my 
tongue was shredded during secret meetings, smuggled arms 
through cordons of bloodhounds, sharks, and informers . . . and 
all that for this lazy mass of black flesh that won't move except 
when kicked by the boot, and what business of mine is the 
slavery in Jamaica, anyway, I'm a Frenchman after all—Wait, 
Sasportas—but I want to turn black on the spot if I understand 
why all that shouldn't be true anymore and cancelled and no 
task for nothing anymore, because in Paris a general is getting 
cocky. (97) 
While reaffirming his lack of a personal stake in the cause of the Jamaican slaves 
("what business of mine"), Galloudec resists the notion that his mission is void 
("no task for nothing anymore") just because the delegator has been eliminated. 
While Dubuisson holds that a representative's fidelity is to the delegating party 
alone, Galloudec believes that a representative owes fidelity to the delegated 
function itself, as does Sasportas, who protests "What's a general's coup in Paris 
got to do with our task, the liberation of slaves in Jamaica" (97). In the absence 
of the delegator, the representative body in Miiller's play is unsure of its function, 
divided amongst itself as to its proper course of action. (And in a parallel episode 
of The Task that mirrors the principal plot, a twentieth-century office worker 
experiences a crisis regarding his own task when his boss, the delegator, commits 
suicide.) Like actors abandoned by their audience, the emissaries are at a loss. 
The uncertainty regarding the delegated function in The Task may be due 
to an even deeper problem than the dissolution of the delegating party, however. 
The emissaries, as we discovered above, are acting on behalf of the French 
Assembly, not on behalf of'the slaves themselves. The British Crown, which rules 
Jamaica, has certainly not commissioned revolutionary activities, but neither have 
the Jamaicans themselves. Using theatre as an analogy for the political situation, 
The Task, we shall see, hints that the function the Assembly has delegated, the 
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stirring up of a rebellion amongst people who are not its constituents against the 
sovereign of a foreign polis, is not within the Assembly's power to delegate. The 
representatives' task is illegitimate even before the demise of the delegating body. 
Galloudec, Sasportas, and Debuisson are not only political 
representatives, they are also actors. Millier presents the three in an overtly 
theatrical manner. Following a racial argument among the representatives upon 
their arrival in Jamaica, for instance, Debuisson says, "That was a bad beginning. 
Let's put on our masks" (88), referring to a classic symbol of theatre; moments 
later, he accuses Galloudec of "act[ing] twice out of character" (89), using the 
language of dramatic performance. Galloudec in turn remarks, "It shouldn't be 
hard for you to play the slave, Sasportas, in your black skin" (89), employing the 
same theatrical terminology. And later in the scene the emissaries become actors 
in a play-within-the-play, as "Debuisson Galloudec Sasportas are undressed by 
slaves and bedecked with costumes. Debuisson as Slaveholder, Galloudec as 
Overseer with his whip, Sasportas as Slave" (90). 
The slaves draft the agents into acting roles in this performance called the 
"Theatre of the Revolution." They do not, however, then sit back and assume the 
function of audience; instead, they manipulate the three representatives 
throughout. At various moments in the inset play, according to the stage 
directions, "Slaves as dogs chase Debuisson' (91), "Slaves strike the Dantonhead 
off Galloudec's shoulders, chuck it to each other' (92), and "Slaves drag 
[Debuisson] from the throne and put Sasportas on it, Galloudec as footstool" 
(93). With the play-within-the-play, the slaves stage their own revolution: in 
terms of plot, the Slaveholder played by Debuisson is dethroned in favor of the 
Slave played by Sasportas; in terms of theatrical structure, no one is a passive 
audience—rather, everyone participates in the dramatic action; and in terms of 
offstage politics, slaves use free men for their own devices. In the "Theatre of the 
Revolution," the slaves refuse to delegate power to the three emissaries, just as 
politically, they have not delegated the authority to organize an uprising to the 
three men, who instead act for the French Assembly. 
"Since no man has natural authority over any other, and since force 
creates no right," Rousseau explains, "we can only conclude that agreements are 
the basis of all legitimate authority among men."31 Failing to seek the mandate of 
the Jamaicans themselves, the emissaries lack legitimate authority to act on their 
behalf, however worthy the abolition of slavery may be. The three protagonists of 
Miiller' s play fail to perform a legitimate act of representation because the 
delegating party (the French Assembly) is defunct, but also because, even when the 
delegating party existed, it lacked the right (to incite a slave rebellion in Jamaica) 
that it tried to delegate. Representation is illegitimate, The Task suggests, due to 
non-possession by the would-be delegator of the power to perform a certain act. 
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"If a principal has an act ascribed to him or is regarded as being 
committed to the normative consequences of an act on the basis of an act of his 
representative," Griffiths tells us, "then the principal must already have the right 
to do or avoid doing the act so ascribed to him."32 In other words, if I delegate an 
individual illegal act such as a murder, then of course I am responsible for it. On 
the other hand, if I delegate a category of action, such as all my national policy-
making or all my acting on stage, then I am not responsible if my representative 
commits a specific illegal act within that category. I am not committed to the 
consequences if my representative the U.S. senator passes a law establishing a 
state religion or if my representative the actor robs a spectator at gunpoint. 
Because those deeds violate constitutional or statutory law, I do not possess the 
right to do them. And, because I do not possess the right to do them, I cannot 
delegate that right to someone else. 
When a number of characters expire at the end of Genet's The Blacks, 
they can be said to die for us, the audience—that is, to act for us when they 
die—because the deaths occur only within the dramatic fiction. Legal limits on 
artistic expression vary among Western societies, most of which set restrictions on 
whatever they define as defamatory, obscene, or likely to incite violence. 
However, no Western society outlaws the portrayal of death per se (that is, death 
that is not also defamatory, or obscene, or likely to incite violence) in fiction. 
Since we, the audience, have the right to depict murder and suicide in art or 
fiction, then any murder or suicide on the part of our representatives within the 
dramatic fiction can legitimately be attributed to us, the delegators. The death 
scene in Philip Massinger's Renaissance drama The Roman Actor, by contrast, 
portrays a murder that cannot be attributed to its audience and thus is invalid as 
theatrical representation. 
Some of the best analyses of failures of representation and delegation 
(like some of the best analyses of successful representation and delegation) occur 
precisely in works written for the stage. Like Marat/Sade and The Task, The 
Roman Actor examines lapses in representation and delegation both in politics and 
in theatre and does so in part by means of a play-within-the-play. Massinger's 
Caesar employs genuine theatre—drama written for the stage—as a means of 
government. Twice he resorts to rule-by-theatre, commissioning the staging of a 
particular play and enforcing the attendance of certain spectators. The emperor 
uses theatre in the two performances to conduct two roles of government, 
respectively: in The Cure of Avarice, the education of a citizen, the miser 
Philargus; and in The False Servant, the execution of a criminal, the would-be-
adulterous Paris. Here, then, we have theatre (The Roman Actor) about a political 
representative (Caesar) who employs theatre (The Cure of Avarice and The Roman 
Actor) as a method of political governance. Fusing political governance and 
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theatrical production, Caesar's manipulations emphasize the rich correspondence 
between the two even as they violate the limits of both. 
Caesar, prior to a truly "command" performance of The False Servant, 
tells Aesopus, who played the part of the jealous husband in previous productions, 
Thou didst not 
Do it to the life. We can perform it better. 
Off with my robe and wreath; since Nero scorned not 
The public theater, we in private may 
Disport ourselves.33 
Caesar takes the role himself and does it "to the life," genuinely stabbing Paris, 
who is acting the part of the adulterous servant. (For Caesar's on-stage audience, 
Aesopus and Latinus, Paris's death is real, even if for Massinger's real-life 
audience it is only an event within the illusionary story.) The emperor tells the 
expiring Paris, "as thou didst live/ Rome's bravest actor, 'twas my plot that thou/ 
Shouldst die in action . . ." (4.2.296-98), and die Paris does. 
Caesar exceeds the limits of theatrical representation by killing a player 
rather than just a character; his violation is revealed by the immediate 
disintegration of the performance. Stabbing his fellow actor, the emperor says, "I 
should talk now,/ But I have forgot my part" (4.2.281-82); Paris understandably 
abandons his dramatic role to cry "Oh! I am slain in earnest" (4.2.283); and 
whatever concluding sequences the script of The False Servant may contain are 
precluded as the enactment ends abruptly, with Caesar hypocritically delivering 
a eulogy for his victim. 
In part, Caesar's murder of Paris breaks the bounds of theatrical 
representation because the action is equivalent in nature to States's set of persons 
and props with such strong workaday signification that they overpower their 
illusionary signification—clocks, dogs, infants, fire, and running water. Latinus 
and Aesopus can hardly concentrate upon the death throes of the fictional 
adulterous servant when confronted with Paris's genuinely bleeding wound: acts 
of bodily harm overwhelm the descriptive representation of theatre. Indeed, the 
two men abandon their function as spectators and proceed to gather up the body 
of their murdered comrade. But when Caesar as actor slays Paris, he also violates 
the tenets of theatrical acting for, just as Caesar as emperor repeatedly breaks the 
law of Rome, despising "[mjonarchs that dare not do unlawful things" (1.2.85) as 
he says through "his instrument" Parthenius (1.2.71). 
Although the dramatic characters of a play have the right to perform an 
enormous set of acts (within legal restraints on artistic expression, as noted above) 
including to murder or to die, the actors have authority to undertake only the more 
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limited range of acts that the audience can delegate to actual persons in the real 
world; murdering a man is not one of these acts. Speaking of the polis, Locke 
states in his Treatise of Civil Government, "nobody can transfer to another more 
power than he has in himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over 
himself, or over any other to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property 
of another."34 Different communities define murder differently, of course, but 
every instance of theatre, existing as it must within some particular state, is subject 
to that state's laws regarding the taking of human life. Constrained by those 
laws—and Massinger makes clear Caesar's disregard for those of 
Rome—playgoers can no more authorize acts of real murder on stage than they 
can authorize an actor to kill the audience. 
When Henry stabs Belcredi at the end of Pirandello's Henry IV, his 
onlookers become convinced that he cannot be acting, pretending to be a crazy 
man who believes he is the medieval German king Henry IV, but must be actually 
crazy. (The "onlookers" to which I refer are Henry's on-stage observers, dramatic 
characters themselves; for Pirandello's real-life audience, of course, Henry is from 
first to last a dramatic character played by an actor.) As Eric Bentley explains, 
"How can the jealous rival prove he is not joking, not play-acting? By using a real 
sword and producing a real death."35 "He's mad, mad," Donna Matilda cries,36 for 
genuine murder can never be a theatrical act. When Caesar kills a man in 
"actuality" within Massinger's fictional drama, he ceases to act for any audience 
and acts only for himself. In a discussion of covenants, Hobbes observes, "as when 
the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when 
the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but 
himself.37 In a similar way, surely Paris's death at Caesar's hands cannot be 
ascribed back to an audience; the illegitimacy of Caesar's act forces the dissolution 
of the play-within-the-play. 
To the best of my knowledge, an actor has never committed a genuine 
murder on stage in the history of Western theatre. Even the widespread conviction 
that the makers of some pornographic movies torture their female leads to death 
on film is unsupported by the available facts. Many people believe that the 1976 
movie Snuff includes footage of the genuine torture and murder of a woman by a 
fellow actor in a film studio, but in fact it does not.38 While the movie's promoters 
capitalized on the rumors, Snuff contains a simulated slaying, not a real one, 
Avedon Carol explains. The actress in question has given interviews to prove her 
continued existence—the persisting rumors are simply more persuasive than the 
truth.39 However nicely such a movie would fit into our discussion of murder on 
stage, it is reassuring to learn that reprehensible films of this sort probably do not 
exist: by 1993, "no 'snuff movie (i.e., where actors are actually killed) has been 
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discovered by police anywhere in the world," according to feminist critic Nettie 
Pollard.40 
One of the most notorious murders in theatre history, however, that of 
Abraham Lincoln at Ford's Theatre in Washington in 1865, does come very close 
to being an onstage murder committed by a performing actor. The actor John 
Wilkes Booth, Lincoln's assassin, was not part of the cast for the evening's fare, 
Our American Cousin by Tom Taylor, although he had acted in the play several 
years earlier.41 But, he did jump down onto the stage from the President's box 
after shooting Lincoln. After landing onstage, Booth delivered a performance of 
his own, brandishing a knife and roaring, "Sic semper tyrannis!" and "The South 
is avenged!," historian Gene Smith relates.42 The audience mistook both the 
gunshot and Booth's unexpected entrance for part of the farce, according to Smith, 
which is hardly surprising given that a handsome, well-known actor had taken the 
stage and was behaving in melodramatic fashion. Booth fled the stage, and still 
the spectators waited for the play to resume.43 When guests in the Presidential box 
began to yell "Stop that man!," Smith reports, "[s]ome spectators hesitantly stood 
up, and those behind them who thought it was all part of the play called, 'Sit 
down!' and 'Down in front!'"44 
Even one of Our American Cousin's actors, backstage at the time, 
mistook the detonation of Booth's gun for some new piece of stage business just 
added to the production. However, the actor who was at that moment legitimately 
onstage, Harry Hawk, recognized Booth and ran after him. Like Hawk, the actress 
Laura Keene abandoned her dramatic role upon Booth's invasion of the 
performance. Keene, who had been waiting in the wings to make her entrance, 
now walked onto the stage out of character and asked the occupants of the 
President's box what the matter was.45 
The audience's misunderstanding of Booth's deadly performance ended 
abruptly as someone near the President replied that Lincoln had been shot, and 
Mary Lincoln began to scream horribly. Spectators shrieked and rushed toward 
the front of the theatre, smashing the orchestra's equipment on their way; a mob 
mounted the stage and ran around in a directionless frenzy, according to Smith's 
vivid account.46 The actress Helen Trueman, part of the cast that evening, later 
described the horror she witnessed: "Mrs. Lincoln's screams turned the house into 
an inferno of noise. There will never be anything like it on earth. The shouts, 
groans, curses, smashing of seats, screams of women, cries of terror, created a 
pandemonium."47 With the knowledge that the gunshot they had heard in the 
theatre had been that of a real bullet wounding a real man, Our American Cousin's 
audience cut short its conventional relationship with the stage, abandoning sitting 
quietly in favor of rushing around and yelling. 
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In its horror and rage, the crowd shouted not only "Kill him!," 
presumably referring to Booth, but also "Burn the theatre!"48 As observed above, 
although dramatic characters may undertake an enormous range of acts on behalf 
of playgoers, actors themselves may not murder within the theatre anymore than 
they may outside it. Even if Booth had been legitimately performing in the play 
that evening and had assassinated Lincoln onstage, his deed (morally abominable 
under any circumstances, of course) would have violated the laws of the theatre 
just as it violated the laws of the state. Ford's Theatre was not burned, but it was 
shut down for a century following the assassination, as if within Ford's walls the 
theatrical contract had been so badly damaged it could not be quickly repaired. 
Not only murder, but all acts of genuine physical wounding within a 
theatrical performance break the terms of the theatrical compact. Such acts falls 
outside the spectrum of deeds that the audience can delegate to persons in the real 
world, and thus these acts cannot be delegated to actors. When a collaborator of 
performance artist Chris Burden shot Burden in the shoulder in a piece called 
Shoot?9 the performance certainly was not theatre. Burden's associate was not 
acting for the members of Shoof s audience; lacking the right to shoot Burden 
themselves, the spectators could not delegate it to an actor. Similarly, "the 
shedding of real blood and the breaking of real teeth," which were sometimes 
incurred by the actors in Brook's 1964 production of Marat/Sade during the 
inmate-riot scene,50 could not be ascribed back to the playgoers and thus violated 
the compact between stage and audience. 
Massinger's Caesar not only abrogates the theatrical compact with his 
own audience by shedding Paris's "real" blood, but also violates the social contract 
with the citizens of Rome by encroaching upon the senate. Both in his dual office 
of stage manager and actor and in his position as emperor, Caesar turns his every 
whim into law: "When power puts in its plea the laws are silenced," Parthenius 
explains (1.2.44). Caesar coerces his fellow players and the senate alike into 
supporting roles: a dissenting senator complains, "The flattering senate/ Decrees 
him divine honors" (1.2.110-11). In Locke's view, such behavior clearly 
transgresses the social contract, the implicit agreement between citizens and 
government whereby the former agree to obey the laws of the polis in return for 
protection by the latter: 
the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, 
both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execution 
of the law, acts against both when he goes about to set up his 
own arbitrary will as the law of society. He acts also contrary to 
his trust when he . . . employs the force, treasure, and offices of 
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the society, to corrupt the representatives and gain them to his 
purposes . . .51 
Locke holds that when the sovereign executive forsakes his side of the contract, 
holding himself above the existing laws of society, this is "effectually to dissolve 
the government,"52 and Rousseau concurs. For Locke, the violation by the prince 
lies in the abuse of his sovereignty, or supreme power, while for Rousseau, who 
locates sovereignty with the people and not their rulers, the violation lies in the 
usurpation of the sovereign power, but the latter agrees that "when the prince no 
longer administers the state in accordance with the law," it causes the "dissolution 
of the state."53 By the standards of the social contract theory of Locke and 
Rousseau, Caesar's behavior is defined as despotism, and that despotism 
effectively dissolves the political transactions of both Rome and the performance 
of The False Servant. 
While Caesar violates his responsibility towards the spectators of a play-
within-a-play, Peter Handke's twentieth-century drama Offending the Audience 
flirts with tyrannizing Handke's own real-life audience. The actors announce to 
the audience that they will not perform any of the traditional functions of 
theatrical representation for them: "You will see no spectacle./ Your curiosity will 
not be satisfied. . . . You are sharing no experience."54 In addition to the famous 
insulting of the playgoers ("You were a sight to have seen, you ass-kissers you 
small-timers. . . . You educated gasbags" [29-32]), the performance issues edicts 
to the audience that overstep the laws of theatre: 
Don't blink. Don't salivate. Don't bat your eyelashes. Don't 
inhale. Don't exhale. Don't shift in your seat. Don't listen to 
us. Don't smell. Don't swallow. Hold your breath. (21) 
These commands infringe upon various small-scale but biologically crucial 
physical freedoms; they infringe upon the right to private acts which spectators 
retain even as they delegate authority for public speech and action to then-
representatives on stage. Many spectators may perceive these orders as just an 
illusion; for them, Offending the Audience is theatre despite its putative attempts 
not to be. But if a production of Handke's play ever convinced an audience that 
it must try to stop blinking, salivating, breathing, that production would truly 
succeed in abrogating the theatrical contract through behavior which, due to the 
properties it shares with political despotism, I will term "despotic." 
When Brook brought his production of Marat/Sade to New York's Martin 
Beck Theatre, audience members occasionally did experience impaired physical 
functioning. David Richard Jones reports that "spectators became ill, and at least 
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one spectator, the German actress Ruth Yorick, died in the auditorium during a 
performance."53 While we cannot attribute every theatregoer's fainting, illness, 
or death to despotic behavior on the part of whatever performance that theatregoer 
is attending when stricken, Brook's Marat/Sade certainly bombarded its audience 
with horrific images in Artaudian style, attempting "to make contact with the 
madhouse that is the world," in Jones's words.56 At the end of the final scene of 
Brook's Marat/Sade, that of the inmates' riot, "the massed lunatics, wildly 
singing, begin a menacing procession toward the audience," according to Charles 
Marowitz57—surely an effort to terrify the spectators, if not a deliberate attempt to 
violate their bodily freedoms. 
In government, a representative becomes a despot not only by violating 
certain protected freedoms of the people, but also by encroaching upon the 
authority or liberty of other representatives. Massinger's Caesar, who coerces the 
senators of Rome into exempting their emperor from the law and who executes 
two who dissent (Junius Rusticus and Palphurius Sura), behaves despotically. In 
theatre, the analogous phenomenon is the behavior of a director who pressures 
actors into aversive or illegal actions and who beats them when they refuse, thus 
infringing upon the liberty of other representatives. Theatre and film directors 
often have reputations as tyrants, and directors frequently persuade actors to suffer 
emotionally or physically for art's sake. A number of actors under the direction 
of German theatre and film artist Rainer Werner Fassbinder, however, were 
subjected to such harsh methods of persuasion that their consent to perform certain 
deeds was not freely given. Fassbinder stands apart from most other demanding 
directors in the coerciveness of his regime and the illegality of some of the deeds 
he tried to impose upon his actors. 
Ronald Hayman's Fassbinder: Film Maker describes its subject as 
"obsessive about winning power over other people,"58 and Fassbinder was 
extraordinarily successful in his obsession. Due in part to Fassbinder's talent and 
industry (which enabled him to make enormous sums of money), and in part to the 
sheer force of his personality, the director's control over the group of people who 
worked on most of his plays and films was "as certain as the divine right of 
kings," as his biographer Robert Katz puts it.59 Like many kings before him, the 
director used this great power to impair the freedoms of others. During the 
filming of Whity, producer Peter Berling recounts, Fassbinder got mad at actor Ulli 
Lommel and vented his anger by staging a beating in front of the camera: 
There was a character in the script who was a nymphomaniac 
not averse to beating her grown, mentally retarded stepson. So 
Rainer cast Ulli's wife, Katrin, as the nympho-sadist and Ulli as 
the half-wit, and in one scene Rainer made her strike Ulli so 
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many times that they both dropped to the ground weeping for 
mercy.60 
The blows the director commanded Lommers wife to give her husband were 
genuine. Fassbinder pressured his actors into incurring not just severe discomfort, 
like that many actors endure, but real physical harm, thus infringing upon one of 
the liberties theatrical representatives retain when they enter the theatrical 
contract: the fundamental right not to incur bodily harm while acting. 
For Whity, Fassbinder contrived to have one actor hit another; on other 
occasions, he delivered the blows himself. For years, actress Irm Hermann was 
one of Fassbinder's most devoted followers, but eventually even she denied some 
of his demands. Her first rebellion came when, acting in one of Fassbinder's 
plays, she refused the director's request to remove her underpants, climb up a 
ladder, and display herself.61 Fassbinder would not accept her insubordination, 
Hermann remembers: 
He couldn't conceive of my refusing him, and he tried 
everything. He almost beat me to death on the streets of 
Bochum . . . Then, in the very next film, he wanted me to play 
a whore in a garter belt, and when I said no, he came around 
early the next morning holding a bottle of milk, and he hit me 
on the head with it.62 
Subjecting Hermann to violent physical assault in an attempt to make her submit 
to his direction on stage and in a film (a failed attempt on both occasions), 
Fassbinder encroached upon the actress's liberty in what I am calling a despotic 
manner. 
Exposing herself on stage as Fassbinder wanted Hermann to do may have 
been antipathetic for her, but it was apparently not illegal in Berlin in the 1970s. 
Prostitution, however, was against the law in 1960s Munich, as was cocaine use 
in the same city in 1976; Fassbinder pressed actors to engage in both activities. 
The first theatre company Fassbinder joined (and quickly dominated), the Action 
Theater of Munich's Mullerstrasse, was perpetually short of cash, recounts Katz. 
So Fassbinder persuaded a number of the group's women to work as prostitutes in 
order to earn extra money for him, thus getting them to break the law for his own 
ends.63 While Katz does not tell us how the women felt about this arrangement, 
he does record the great reluctance of actor Kurt Raab to take cocaine on the set 
of the movie Bolwieser, as well as the relentlessness of the director in pushing 
Raab to do so. At the very outset of filming, Raab recalls, Fassbinder suggested 
to the actor that he use cocaine in order to improve his acting and help him to 
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"create a Bolwieser far beyond [his] normal range."64 Raab, an alcoholic, refused, 
arguing that he might develop an addiction to cocaine. Nevertheless, Fassbinder 
hounded him for three weeks until Raab finally succumbed, taking cocaine every 
day for the rest of the shooting.65 Raab may have been more concerned about his 
health than about staying within the law; nevertheless, the director did conspire 
to make Raab break the law. Taking a psychological approach to his subject, 
Hayman concludes that "[s]ome of the best directors work sadistically, while some 
of the best actors are masochistically in need of someone who can goad them 
. . ."
66
 Hayman may or may not be correct; however, in terms of the theory of 
representation I am advancing here, we can categorize Fassbinder's 
behavior—whether inflicting physical injury on actors or pressuring them to defy 
the law—as despotic. 
I have attempted here to show that western theatre involves not only the 
familiar descriptive and symbolic forms of representation, but also a third kind of 
representation, that of acting for. As useful as it is to consider how a theatrical 
performance can create descriptive likenesses of certain people and things, or how 
it can provide symbols of certain cultural constructs, it is useful too to consider 
how it can act in lieu o/its spectators. If working clocks, fire, running water, 
babies, and dogs create a "disturbance" on the stage, it may be in part because 
these things lack the rational consciousness to act in the interest of others and can 
thus provide only incomplete representation. If the shooting of a performance 
artist by his collaborator seems to a spectator to be a daring performance but not 
really theatre, it may be because the spectator does not possess, and thus cannot 
delegate, the right to shoot Burden. The collaborator is not acting on behalf of 'the 
spectator, so the shooting is invalid as representation. And by using the concept 
of acting for, we can understand the behavior of theatrical representatives in a 
particular political light. That is, we can interpret a performance's violation of the 
rights of theatregoers or a director's infringement upon the liberty of actors as 
corresponding to the behavior of a political despot.67 
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